Do Risky Microfinance Borrowers Really Invest in Risky Projects? Experimental Evidence from Bolivia. by Zeballos, Eliana et al.
The University of San Francisco
USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library |
Geschke Center
Economics College of Arts and Sciences
2014
Do Risky Microfinance Borrowers Really Invest in
Risky Projects? Experimental Evidence from
Bolivia.
Eliana Zeballos
Alessandra Cassar
University of San Francisco, acassar@usfca.edu
Bruce Wydick
University of San Francisco, wydick@lucas.usfca.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.usfca.edu/econ
Part of the Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Arts and Sciences at USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library |
Geschke Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics by an authorized administrator of USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson
Library | Geschke Center. For more information, please contact repository@usfca.edu.
Recommended Citation
Eliana Zeballos, Alessandra Cassar & Bruce Wydick. Do Risky Microfinance Borrowers Really Invest in Risky Projects? Experimental
Evidence from Bolivia. The Journal of Development Studies Volume 50, Issue 2, 2014. DOI: 10.1080/00220388.2013.858124
 1 
 
 
Do Risky Microfinance Borrowers  
Really Invest in Risky Projects?  
Experimental Evidence from Bolivia 
 
JEL Classifications: C9, O16, G21 
Keywords: Credit Markets, Microfinance, Asymmetric Information, Experimental Economics 
 
Eliana Zeballos* Alessandra Cassar**        Bruce Wydick*** 
 
 
May 6, 2013 
 
 
Abstract: This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to test a 
fundamental assumption in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model of credit rationing, 
that defaulting borrowers are associated with investment in risky projects. 
Through an artefactual field experiment with 200 Bolivian microfinance 
borrowers, we observe that subjects from real-world delinquent borrowing groups 
do not prefer risky projects to safer ones significantly more than subjects from 
repaying groups. Moreover, when faced with the choice between two options 
framed as consumption or a relatively safe investment project, risky borrowers 
significantly opt more for consumption, supporting more recent behavioral 
theories of credit market failure. This result has important implications for our 
understanding of microfinance in developing countries: defaulting microfinance 
borrowers may be those that take too little investment risk rather than those who 
take too much. 
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 “Poor people are not credit worthy… they will not be able to pay back… no matter how much money you give,  
they will eat and the money will be over, they can’t pay you back.” 
Muhammad Yunus, on how banks justify denying credit to the poor 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In one of the most celebrated papers in economics, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) develop a 
model of credit markets that demonstrates how adverse selection and moral hazard emerge 
under asymmetric information to create incentives for borrowers to invest in risky projects.  
This incentive to undertake risky projects forms the basis for a credit rationing equilibrium in 
which many borrowers who desire to take loans at the market interest rate are denied.  The 
model has been applied extensively as a basis for understanding the nature of microfinance 
markets in developing countries, and even as a motivation for microfinance itself; indeed a 
recent search in Google scholar showed 1,070 papers that discuss the Stiglitz and Weiss model 
in the context of  microfinance. 
The question of  whether or not the Stiglitz and Weiss model holds for microfinance has 
important policy implications for development economics as well as development practice. 
Fundamentally, it affects the way we think about delinquency in microfinance: Are risky 
microfinance borrowers those who take too much risk, or, as more recent behavioral economics 
research suggests, are risky microfinance borrowers those who favor the safety of  consumption 
over investment and thus in some sense take on too little risk?   
In this paper we report the results of an artefactual field experiment designed to 
investigate the characteristics of borrowers that a microfinance institution would consider 
“risky”, borrowers who are members of delinquent groups that failed to repay in time. In 
particular, we are interested in testing Stiglitz and Weiss’ (1981) assumption underlying credit 
market failure: that risky borrowers are those who invest in risky projects.  We proceed by 
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testing whether there is any correlation between borrowers that a bank considers risky and 
their choices of riskier vs. safer projects (moral hazard), consumption vs. investment (cheating 
moral hazard), or homegrown preference towards risk (adverse selection).  
We carried out  an artefactual field experiment among 200 Bolivian microfinance 
borrowers from PORVENIR, S.A., a microfinance institute in El Alto, Bolivia. The sample of  
subjects was purposely stratified to include a large number of  real-world delinquent borrowers: 
three-fifths of  our subjects were members of  small borrowing groups who had experienced 
significant problems with timely loan repayment. The remaining subjects, whom we will refer 
to as “safe borrowers,” came from borrowing groups without any difficulties in loan repayment. 
The experiment was framed as a microfinance loan assigned to each subject. Each 
subject participated in two distinct treatments administered in random order.1 In a first 
treatment, individual borrowers were asked to choose between investing in either: 1) a risky 
project with a low probability of  a high return, or 2) a safer investment project with a high 
probability of  a lower return. In a second treatment (carried out in random order with the 
other treatments to prevent learning order-effects), the same borrowers were presented with a 
choice between: 1) investing the loan in the safer investment project, or 2) not investing the 
loan but rather use it for “consumption” (a certain payoff  that involved delinquency). 
Our results reveal no evidence that real-world risky borrowers (subjects from real-
world delinquent groups) have a tendency to prefer risky choices or to be endowed with risk 
tolerance preferences higher than the rest. On the contrary, we find that they prefer safer 
choices and, when faced with the “consumption” vs. a relatively safe investment option, they 
prefer to consume their loans at a rate nearly double that of  the safe borrowers (30% vs. 18%, 
p = 0.06).  In short, our results find no empirical support for the assumptions that underpin the 
                                                 
1 The complete experiment consisted of  several other treatments designed to investigate other aspects of  moral 
hazard and self-selection in group-settings. These treatments and results are described in a companion paper 
(Barboni., Cassar, Rodriguez, and Wydick, forthcoming). 
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Stiglitz and Weiss credit model. Instead, our results offer some evidence that the fundamental 
source of  moral hazard in credit markets appears to lie in diverting loans from investment to 
consumption, consistent with some more recent models of  behavior in credit markets (e.g.  
Bertrand et al. 2005; Ashraf  et al. 2006; Gugerty 2007; and Banerjee and Mullainathan 2010).  
According to these newer models, moral hazard in credit transactions is not related to the 
temptation to invest in risky projects, but rather in the temptation to consume borrowed capital 
instead of  investing it in productively.  
Whether the behavior underlying the traditional model or the newer behavioral-
economics-based models is better able to explain the origin of  default has important 
implications for microfinance policy. If  the basis of  microfinance default lies in the temptation 
of  using loans for present consumption rather than undertaking risky projects, then training 
loan officers to dissuade microfinance borrowers from investing in risky projects will have little 
impact on default. On the contrary, our experimental results suggest that, to reduce 
microfinance default, practitioners should encourage borrowers to engage in the normal risks 
associated with entrepreneurial investment rather giving in to the temptation to  use loans for 
household consumption.  
2. RELATED LITERATURE 
The Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model of  credit market failure presents a type of  moral 
hazard in which borrowers, due to a convex payoff  function over returns, have an incentive to 
invest in risky projects over safer ones.  This incentive is at odds with the interests of  lenders, 
who, given their concave payoff  function over borrower returns, would prefer borrowers to 
invest in safer projects to increase the probability of  loan repayment.  In their model, riskier 
borrowers are willing to pay higher interest rates because they realize higher rates of  return in 
the good states of  nature, but are insulated from losses under joint liability in the bad state of  
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nature.  Credit rationing occurs because lenders have an incentive to keep interest rates at sub-
market-clearing levels in order to bring safer projects back into the pool.  
This “risky-versus-safe project” framework has had a powerful influence on the 
development economics literature and has become a theoretical starting point in textbook 
chapters on credit markets for leading undergraduate and graduate texts in development 
economics (for example, Ray, 1997; Bardhan and Udry, 1999) and microfinance (Armendáriz 
and Morduch, 2005; 2010). This “risky-versus-safe project” framework has given birth to 
theories regarding the ability of  group lending to mitigate problems of  adverse selection and 
moral hazard. Stiglitz (1990) argues that the peer monitoring advantages inherent in group 
lending dissuade borrowers from undertaking investments in risky projects.  The same 
framework underlies the foundation of  Banerjee, Ghatak, and Guinnane's (1994) model of  peer 
monitoring in early German credit cooperatives.  Adverse-selection-based group lending 
models developed by Ghatak (1999, 2000), Van Tassel (1999), Ghatak and Guinnane (2001), and 
Armendáriz de Aghion and Gollier (2000) all adopt the risky-versus-safe projects framework to 
demonstrate the potentially advantageous self-selection properties of  group lending and its 
ability to screen borrowers with risky projects from a lender's portfolio.  Early empirical work 
on group lending such as Wenner (1995) and Wydick (1999) implicitly adopts the Stiglitz and 
Weiss framework to ascertain whether group lending is able to improve borrower repayment 
via selection and internal enforcement mechanisms.  The model has also formed the basis of  
experimental design in recent experimental work in microfinance, such as Giné et al. (2010). 
 In contrast, the real fear of  many practitioners in developing countries doesn’t appear 
to be that borrowers would take too much investment risk with borrowed capital, rather too 
little risk.  One of  the main reasons given by formal lenders for not lending to the poor is the 
fear these borrowers who lack collateral would not invest the loan but instead direct it for 
consumption needs. According to Yunus (1995), the traditional fear among formal lenders has 
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been that the poor lack the self-discipline to abstain from consumption when in possession of  a 
large sum of  money intended for productive investment. While these views tend to be reported 
more anecdotally than in the academic literature, they are pervasive enough to warrant 
investigation.  
The idea that consumption-based moral hazard might constitute a greater source of  
moral hazard than the fear of  investment in projects that are too risky makes economic sense in 
many contexts involving lending, such as, but not limited to microfinance.  First of  all, the type 
of  activity in which microfinance borrowers invest is more often than not an exogenous choice, 
determined by a rather fixed set of  skills and identity:  A baker will invest in an oven; a vendor 
selling pants will buy boxes of  pants.  Second, since the type of  business operated by the 
borrower is known by the loan officer, the type of  project in which a borrower invests is one of  
the more salient components of  a credit transaction.  On the contrary, much more susceptible 
to hidden action is the diversion of  all or part of  the loan from the investment activity toward 
household consumption.  
 This kind of  consumption-based moral hazard is cited by both practitioners and many 
recent theories about saving and borrowing such as Ashraf  et al. (2006), Bertrand et al. (2005), 
and Banerjee and Mullainathan (2010).  This research tends to view the problem of  saving, 
borrowing, and investment as a self-control issue. Microfinance loans are seen as commitment 
devices to keep resources directed toward capital with payoffs in the future and away from 
consumption goods--especially “temptation goods”--that have a payoff  only in the present.  
From this perspective, microfinance contracts may function as a device that commits borrowers 
to a series of  formal payments to finance a productive capital investment.  For example, one of  
the principal advantages of  non-profit microfinance, which often places an emphasis on 
building entrepreneurial capacities, may be that the esprit de corps of  training sessions create a 
collective reference point around successful entrepreneurialism and loan repayment.  Another 
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advantage of  group lending (even without joint liability) may be the recurrent “nudge” by the 
other members to focus one another on timely repayment and away from the temptation of  
using current liquidity for current consumption.   Seen in this light, borrowing may just be 
another form of  saving, but embodied in a stronger commitment device.     
This temptation to divert credit granted for business investment to household 
consumption has empirical support.  For example, in a sample of  1,672 microfinance 
households in Guatemala, India, and Ghana, McIntosh et al. (2011) find that among borrowers 
who had taken loans officially for business investment, the probability of  a television set 
purchase rose 1.7 percentage points (over a baseline probability of  only 4.3 percentage points) 
in the first year that a microfinance loan was taken.   
3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
3.1 SAMPLE  
The data reported in this paper come from an artefactual field experiment and survey 
carried out in Bolivia during July and August 2009.  Our subject pool consists of 200 borrowers 
from PORVENIR S.A., a medium-sized Bolivian microfinance institution located in El Alto, a 
northeastern suburb of La Paz specializing in group lending. PORVENIR's borrowers typically 
receive a six-month loan at a 3% interest rate with payments every two weeks.  Loan size varies 
from 1,000 to 4,000 Bolivianos (US$143 to US$571) with larger sizes depending on borrowers’ 
previous performance.   Table 1 reports summary statistics of subject characteristics. Our 
sample was 87% female, with an average age of 37 years.  About 65% of our subjects were 
married, 56% owned the house in which they lived, had an average of 8.5 years of formal 
education, and earned a household income of US $193 per month. Within our sample, 122 out 
of 200 subjects were borrowers from delinquent groups in arrears with loan repayments.  
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PORVENIR was not able to give us information about the specific circumstances about 
the role of each individual in a delinquent group.  That a group under joint liability is in default 
means that borrowers in the group are unable to bring together the necessary funds required to 
make one or more joint-liability loan repayments.  In this respect accountability for default is 
shared by all members of a defaulting group, both the borrowers within the group who fail to 
make cash available for their share of borrowed capital and their borrowing group partners who 
refuse to contribute to the troubled group loan. Although the behavior of these borrowers who 
fail to cover for partners’ loans is arguably not the primary cause of the group default, it is 
certainly the secondary cause of the group default.  Thus it is reasonable to assume that each 
member of a delinquent borrowing group embodies a greater average risk to a microfinance 
lender than members of borrowing groups who have never experienced repayment problems. 
Therefore, in our analysis we consider a borrowing group member with a microfinance 
loan in arrears as a “risky” borrower.  The non-risky subjects came from groups with no history 
of repayment problems.  While any measure of borrower riskiness is imperfect, we have reason 
to believe ours is a good approximation capable of capturing important variations within the 
borrowing pool.2 
Sample recruitment was carried out by PORVENIR’s loan officers among their active 
borrowers, from either repaying or delinquent groups.  Our sample does not contain members 
of completely defaulting groups, since these were no longer clients of the institution, but we 
cannot exclude the possibility that some of these delinquent groups might have become 
defaulting groups at a later date. PORVENIR officers were only involved in the recruitment 
phase of the experiment. They did not take any part in the data collection process, and they 
                                                 
2 Research on group lending, such as Ghatak (1999) and Van Tassel (1999), has moreover argued that an important 
feature of  joint-liability is that under self-selection groups should form homogeneously with respect to individual 
risk under an assortative matching process.  While this formation process in practice is certainly imperfect, the 
point of  their argument is well taken: there remains an incentive in group lending for high-risk borrowers to 
match with other high-risk borrowers, and low-risk to match with low-risk, where the homogeneity of  groups 
ought to be commensurate with the level of  information between borrowers about their types. 
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were not present during any of the sessions and were not informed about individual 
experimental outcomes. The subjects were informed several times throughout the experiment 
that their choices would remain anonymous.  
We carried out 17 sessions in total, where each session comprised of  either 10 or 15 
subjects.  Depending on the outcome of  the experiments, subjects earned payouts of  up to 73 
bolivianos (US$10.50), more than one day's minimum salary where the monthly minimum wage 
was US$92.5 in 2009. The sessions were held at the group’s regular meeting place, typically the 
house of  one of  the group members.  
3.2 EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENTS 
The complete experimental design was comprised of seven different loan experimental 
treatments and a final risk aversion task. The experimental treatments were administered in 
random order and without revealing to the subject the results until the very end of the entire 
experiment to prevent wealth effects and correlation across treatments. Throughout the 
experiment the instructions were framed in the context of a microfinance loan (see Appendix).  
Under all of the loan treatments, each subject began the task with 500 bolivianos to be used as 
collateral for the securement of an experimental “loan” equal to 1000 bolivianos at 20% interest. 
Safer vs. Riskier Investment Project Treatement. For the Safer vs. Riskier Project 
treatment, each subject had to choose between investing a loan in a safer project or into a 
riskier one. The Safer project, if successful, would return a gross payoff of 3,000 bolivianos.   
The probability of success was 5/6, implemented by tossing a six-faced die in front of the 
subject if this task was the one randomly selected for payment at the end of the session. If the 
project failed (with 1/6 probability), the return was zero. In contrast, the Riskier project 
returned a gross payoff of 5,000 bolivianos or zero, each with probability 1/2.  Again, the toss 
of the die (three faces were considered success, the other three failures) would occur in the 
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presence of the subjects if selected for payment. Under either project, only in case of success 
would the subject be able to repay the principal of 1,000 bolivianos plus the 200 bolivianos in 
interest. Net profit would be 1,800 bolivianos, plus the 500 collateral, for a total of 2,300 
bolivianos, in case the subject was successful and chose the Safer project, or 4,300 bolivianos 
(3,800 bolivianos plus the 500 collateral) if she chose the Riskier one. In cases of project failure, 
subjects would lose their 500 bolivianos collateral, and therefore would have earnings of zero. 
For more detailed explanations of the payoffs, refer to the Appendix where we provide a 
complete summary of our experimental protocol and instructions.  
Consumption vs. Safer Investment Project. For the Consumption vs. Safer Investment 
Project, each subject had to choose between allocating her experimental loan either into a 
zero-risk project, which we framed in terms of  “consumption,” or “investment” in the safer 
project. The instructions specified that if  a subject chose the low-payoff, zero-risk option (i.e. to 
consume the loan rather than investing it), she would keep the 1,000 bolivianos principal but 
would default on the loan and lose the 500 collateral.  If  a subject chose to invest, she would 
earn a gross payoff  of  3,000 bolivianos (less the 1200 principal and interest payments) with 
5/6 probability or zero with 1/6 probability. Net profit would then be 2,300 in case of  success 
(3,000 minus principal and interest, plus the collateral back), zero otherwise.  
Our experimental tasks are very simple and, as such, are not intended to capture all 
aspects of  lending dynamics.  Repaid microfinance loans are typically rewarded with 
subsequent loans, and this may represent one of  the most important motives for borrowers to 
repay a loan. We leave the dynamics out of  our framework and develop a framework primarily 
designed to test the assumption that risky borrowers are associated with risky projects, not to 
directly assess the empirical validity of  a particular behavioral-based credit theory. We believe 
this simplicity is a virtue, even as we acknowledge its shortcomings.  For example, the choice to 
consume rather than invest could be due to extreme risk aversion (for which we control with 
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the risk task), present bias, or a combination of  the two.  In a subsequent experiment one could 
introduce a time gap between the choice to consume and the one to invest, or a time elicitation 
component to the experiment, to account for the differences between extreme risk aversion 
and/or impatience. Here we implemented a static game with subject decisions made at a single 
point in time, where our experiment was designed in this way so that dynamic incentives, 
monitoring, and the other aspects of  microfinance that are important in the real-world are held 
constant and identical between treatments.  
 Risk Task. To investigate the role that individual attitudes towards risk might have in 
being a risky or safe borrower, our experiment included a risk task to elicit an estimate of  
individual risk aversion. While it is still open to debate whether risk attitudes change in 
systematic ways in the aftermath of  different life events or are a more permanent feature of  an 
individual’s personality (e.g. Cassar, Healy and von Kessler 2010), we could foresee the 
possibility that being part of  a defaulting group could cause individual risk preferences to shift. 
If  this were the case, a borrower’s preference for “consumption” could be due to increased risk 
aversion instead of  the other way round. Since we did not have any data on pre-delinquency 
risk attitudes, we cannot make any statement here about causality.  We use our elicited 
estimates of  risk aversion at the time of  the experiment as control, aware that the causality 
could theoretically move in the opposite direction. Nevertheless, an uncontrolled t-test of  risk-
aversion between borrowers from delinquent and non-delinquent groups shows no statistical 
difference between these groups (4.9 vs. 4.8 respectively, p = 0.62), and when being in a 
delinquent group is regressed on the controls plus elicited risk aversion, parameters 
furthermore display non-significant results.  Thus ex-post, after being already in a delinquent 
group, we see no difference in risk aversion between the two groups, but we cannot say 
anything about their ex-ante preferences.   
 From a procedural perspective, the risk task was administered at the end of  the session 
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before any of  the actual outcomes of  the previous experimental games were revealed to the 
subjects in order to prevent correlation between games. The protocol was based on the MPL 
(Multiple Price List) procedure of  Holt and Laury (2002). The MPL protocol consists of  
presenting subjects with a series of  choices between two distinct lotteries, Lottery A and 
Lottery B.  The two payoffs of  each lottery (one for the good outcome, one for the bad 
outcome) are constant, but the probabilities of  success (good outcome) change from one round 
to the next.  In our experiment, Lottery A offered the subjects an opportunity to gain either 
2000 (experimental) bolivianos or 1600 bolivianos.3  Lottery B offered a higher gain of  3850 
bolivianos in its high state, but only a 100-boliviano gain in its low state.  Subjects had to decide 
which one of  the two lotteries they preferred, one choice for each one of  ten rounds in which 
the probability of  the good outcome increased in increments of  10% from 0 to 100%. Because 
probability is an abstract concept, lottery probabilities were explained to subjects in terms of  
frequencies with the help of  colored balls as visual aids.  Depending on the round in which a 
subject switched from Lottery A to Lottery B, we can infer individual risk preferences. (The 
later the round in which the subjects selected lottery B, the higher is her estimated risk 
aversion). In case a subject switched back to Lottery A after having switched to Lottery B, we 
use the first time she switched to B as measure of  her risk aversion,4 a common solution to this 
puzzling choice when using the MPL procedure (see Harrison and Rutström, 2008). 
 At the end of  all the experimental tasks, subjects filled out a questionnaire covering age, 
gender, civil status, education, main occupation, income, expenditures, family size, assets, 
business activity, and home ownership. 
                                                 
3Payoffs from the experiments were given in experimental bolivianos at a conversion rate of  100 experimental 
bolivianos per actual boliviano. This was so experimenters could use integer numbers to make it easier for 
subjects. Subjects were informed about this conversion rate at the beginning and reminded throughout the session.  
 
4 Using either first switch time or an average does make a significant difference on our results. 
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4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 An uncontrolled t-test between “risky” borrowers and “safe” borrowers over their mean 
choice proportion between the riskier and safer investment projects reveals no significant 
difference between real-world delinquent and non-delinquent borrowers. Borrowers from 
delinquent groups chose the riskier project 29.8 percent of  the time while those from good 
borrowing groups chose it 33.3 percent of  the time (p-value = 0.597). If  anything, the raw 
difference in outcomes contradicts the hypothesis that risky borrowers risk too much: they 
chose the riskier project less frequently and displayed more aversion (both differences 
insignificant, however, from an inferential perspective). However, in our second treatment, when 
the choice is between the zero-risk alternative (framed as consumption) and investment in a 
modestly risky project, borrowers from delinquent groups chose the first option at nearly twice 
the rate, 29.5 percent vs. 17.9 percent of  the time by members of  good borrowing groups 
(p-value = 0.066).  One possibility we considered was that this difference could be due to 
subjects in the delinquent group not understanding the game as well as subjects from solvent 
groups; the consumption option in some respects was a more simple choice.  However, if  this 
were the cause, we would have found similar systematic group differences in the other 
treatments, especially in the risk task, but this is not the case.  Furthermore, the result holds 
even after controlling for education, a variable likely to capture subjects’ understanding of  the 
respective experimental treatments. 
 Table 2 and Table 3 report the regression results for the experimental treatment 
outcomes. Table 2 displays the estimates for the Riskier vs. Safer Project treatment. Both the 
logit and linear probability estimations5 reveal that none of  the independent variables display 
significant explanatory power except for risk aversion. Subjects who demonstrated a higher 
                                                 
5 Given the relative low ratio of  experimental sessions to subjects it would be inappropriate to use clustered 
standard errors. 
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degree of  risk aversion during the risk elicitation task were also less likely to choose the riskier 
project over the safer one: a one standard deviation increase in risk aversion decreases the 
probability of  undertaking the riskier investment by about 6.2 percentage points, significant at 
the 90 percent confidence level. Thus when subjects are faced with choices that involve differing 
levels of  implicit risk, individual risk preferences do matter and, as expected, more risk-averse 
subjects prefer the safer option. However, being a real-world risky borrower appears to have no 
significant effect on a subject’s project choice.    
 Table 3 displays the results of  the Consumption vs. Safer Project Investment treatment. 
On average, 25 percent of  subjects preferred to consume rather than to invest. Importantly, 
those who might be outwardly identified as more reliable borrowers showed a stronger 
tendency toward investment than consumption.  Subjects who owned a business were 22 
percentage points less likely to choose to consume than those with only informal economic 
activity (p-value < 0.01). Every year of  additional education reduced the probability of  
choosing consumption by about 2 percentage points (p-value < 0.05) 
 The most important result from this analysis is that real-word delinquent borrowers 
were significantly more likely to choose the consumption option over investment. The point 
estimate is large (12.8 percentage points more likely relative to a mean of  25 percent) and 
statistically significant (p-value < 0.05). Interestingly, the point estimates are essentially 
unchanged when we control for risk aversion, which becomes insignificant. This result casts 
doubt on the hypothesis that it is mainly risk aversion that induces delinquent borrowers to 
consume rather than to invest, in favor of  alternative hypotheses (like present-bias) that are 
beyond the scope of  the current experiment.  
To summarize our results, our experimental results suggest that risky microfinance 
borrowers, those from delinquent borrowing groups, are not borrowers who invest in risky 
projects, but rather borrowers who are in some sense the opposite: they significantly prefer to 
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consume loans instead of investing--even in a relatively safe project. Furthermore, our results 
show this may be partially due to some factor besides an unwillingness to take on enough of the 
risks associated with entrepreneurial activities. Leading possibilities are impatience or present-
bias, and we leave the further exploration of this hypothesis for future work.  
5. CONCLUSION  
That the risky-project-based framework has enhanced our understanding of  credit market 
failure does not necessarily render it a good framework for building applied models of  credit 
markets in developing countries.  Based on our experimental research, this may particularly 
hold for microfinance.  Here, we argue that theories of  credit markets centered in a risky-
project-based framework may be built on behavioral foundations that lack empirical and 
observational support.  Although there are important facets of  microfinance borrowing that are 
not captured in our simple experimental design (especially dynamic incentives), the simple 
choices and the frame we adopt in our protocol allows us to capture important differences in 
real-borrower characteristics.   
If  the implications of  the traditional moral hazard models of  credit rationing were to 
transfer to microfinance borrowers, we would expect to find real-world risky borrowers to 
prefer riskier projects over the safer ones. But this is not supported by our data.  Controlling for 
risk-aversion, when faced with the experimental choice between a riskier project and a safer 
project, real-world risky borrowers are no more likely to expose themselves to risky projects 
than safe borrowers. In addition, again after controlling for risk-aversion, we find that these 
same borrowers are instead significantly more likely to choose the certainty of  “consuming” a 
unit of  capital over the small risk involved with choosing a relatively safe investment.   
The assumptions behind models like Stiglitz and Weiss appear to be rooted in what an 
economic theorist can successfully argue should be a major source of  moral hazard in credit 
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markets.  Yet our experimental research cannot confirm any relationship between the desire of  
borrowers to invest in projects with greater risk and actual problems in borrower repayment.   
The traditional risk-based model has been widely used as a theoretical framework for 
understanding credit markets in developing countries and for economic analyses of  
microfinance. Here we propose an alternative explanation for moral hazard which has 
important policy implications for development practitioners. These differences, which we 
summarize in Table 4, are not benign.  If  the source of  moral hazard we describe here more 
accurately reflects its true manifestation in credit markets, a persistent focus on “risky-versus-
safe projects” by microfinance institutions is likely to have little effect on addressing problems 
in poorly performing loan portfolios or under-performing credit institutions.  For example, if  
the main problem facing a lender is the temptation for borrowers to divert borrowed capital 
away from productive investment toward present consumption, an emphasis on ensuring that 
projects are “safe” (say, in terms of  variance in their gross returns) will be of  little use in 
curtailing default. 
 Much of  the more recent literature investigating credit market issues in developing 
countries and microfinance has explored self-control issues, nudges, and reference points as 
lying at the heart of  savings and borrowing behavior (Bertrand et al., 2005; Ashraf  et al., 2006; 
Gugerty, 2007). Our experiment offers modest support to the newer behavioral-economics-
based theories of  borrower behavior, although an experiment designed to test these theories 
directly would better incorporate the dynamics and time lag involved in the consumption vs. 
investment decision. 
Preliminary work from a separate experiment offers measured support for the idea that 
microfinance default may be associated with present bias.  In a small study carried out among 
microfinance borrowers in Jordan, Start (2013) examines measures of  riskiness and impatience 
and their relationship to microfinance default.  In part of  this study borrowers were asked the 
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question “If  you had two Kanafeh (a traditional Arab pastry soaked in a sweet syrup), would 
you eat both today, or eat one today and save the other for later?”.  Microfinance borrowers with 
poor repayment records indicated they would eat the second Kanafeh today 41.7 percent of  the 
time, while borrowers with excellent repayment records indicated they would eat the second 
Kanafeh today only 23.3 percent of  the time.  While regression on an aggregated index of  
impatience indicators is statistically insignificant, it provides an encouraging avenue for future 
research. 
 While the implications of  the Stiglitz and Weiss model for credit rationing and market 
failure would generally not be considered neo-classical, their model assumes a quality of  
borrower rationality to which much of  the behavioral economics literature has offered strong 
empirical challenges.   Further work that incorporates behavioral economics into its research 
methodology will lead to the development of  more robust models that not only allow us to 
understand the nature of  borrower behavior in microfinance markets, but can be used to guide 
important policy questions faced by development practitioners.  
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VARIABLES
Mean      
(Std. Dev.)
Risky 
Borrowers 
(61%)
Safe 
Borrowers 
(39%)
t-test            
p-value         
(two-tailed)
Risky Borrower 0.610
   (from a delinquent group) (0.489)
Female 0.870 0.869 0.872 0.952
(0.337) (0.339) (0.336)
Age 37.270 37.115 37.513 0.830
(12.713) (12.625) (12.928)
Married 0.650 0.648 0.654 0.928
(0.478) (0.480) (0.479)
House owner 0.560 0.525 0.615 0.209
(0.498) (0.501) (0.490)
Persons per room 2.886 2.863 2.923 0.814
(1.751) (1.886) (1.527)
Subject owns business 0.535 0.590 0.449 0.051*
(0.500) (0.494) (0.501)
Income proxy 1350.047 1302.451 1424.492 0.588
   (expenditures - Bolivianos) (1546.523) (1389.762) (1771.134)
Years of  education 8.505 8.025 9.256 0.039**
(4.128) (4.079) (4.120)
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Risk Aversion 4.830 4.877 4.756 0.624
   (experimental elicitation) (1.690) (1.756) (1.589)
Consume vs. Safer project 0.250 0.295 0.179 0.066*
(0.434) (0.458) (0.386)
Riskier vs. Safer project 0.312 0.298 0.333 0.597
(0.464) (0.459) (0.474)
Standard deviations in parentheses
Table 1: Summary statistics
X,s
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VARIABLES
Risky Borrower -0.036 -0.032 -0.029 -0.036 -0.032 -0.028
   (from a delinquent group) (0.068) (0.071) (0.071) (0.068) (0.071) (0.071)
Female -0.078 -0.066 -0.077 -0.065
(0.107) (0.106) (0.103) (0.103)
Age 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Married 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.017
(0.072) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073)
House owner 0.062 0.073 0.063 0.073
(0.068) (0.068) (0.069) (0.069)
Persons per room 0.009 0.007 0.010 0.007
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
Subject owns business 0.037 0.042 0.036 0.043
(0.071) (0.071) (0.072) (0.071)
Income proxy -0.022 -0.024 -0.022 -0.024
   (expenditures - Bolivianos) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
Years of  education 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Risk Aversion -0.0354* -0.0365*
   (experimental elicitation) (0.020) (0.020)
Constant 0.333*** 0.288 0.494
(0.053) (0.288) (0.308)
Observations 199 199 199 199 199 199
Pseudo R2 0.001 0.896 0.030
R-Squared 0.001 0.021 0.038
Adj R-Squared -0.004 -0.025 -0.013
Dep. Variable: 1=Subject choses riskier over safer project (mean 0.312, std. dev. 0.464)
Table 2: Results of  Riskier vs. Safer Investment Treatment
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Logit Estimations                
(marginal effects)
Linear Probability Model
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VARIABLES
Risky Borrower 0.116* 0.128** 0.127** 0.116* 0.129** 0.128**
   (from a delinquent group) (0.060) (0.059) (0.059) (0.063) (0.062) (0.062)
Female 0.079 0.078 0.072 0.070
(0.088) (0.089) (0.090) (0.090)
Age 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Married 0.013 0.011 0.013 0.010
(0.065) (0.066) (0.063) (0.064)
House owner -0.024 -0.025 -0.013 -0.015
(0.062) (0.063) (0.060) (0.060)
Persons per room -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
Subject owns business -0.227*** -0.227*** -0.223*** -0.224***
(0.067) (0.067) (0.062) (0.062)
Income proxy 0.019 0.019 0.021 0.021
   (expenditures - Bolivianos) (0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.024)
Years of  education -0.0168* -0.0167* -0.0192** -0.0192**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Risk Aversion 0.003 0.006
   (experimental elicitation) (0.018) (0.018)
Constant 0.179*** 0.140 0.105
(0.049) (0.248) (0.267)
Observations 200 200 200 200 200 200
Pseudo R2 0.016 0.143 0.143
R-Squared 0.017 0.156 0.156
Adj R-Squared 0.012 0.1156 0.112
Table 3: Results of  Consumption vs. Investment Treatment
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Logit Estimations                
(marginal effects)
Dep. Variable: 1=Subject choses consumption vs. safer project (mean 0.25, std. dev. 0.434)
Linear Probability Model
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Policy Implications of  Policy Implications of  
Traditional Model Present Bias  Model
Borrower Selection
Screening should occur 
over borrower projects
Screening should occur 
over borrower 
entrepreneurialism
Emphasis on decreasing 
risk dissuades 
entrepreneurship
Borrower Behavior
Repayment will be higher 
if  borrowers have low risk 
projects
Repayment high if  
borrower fully invest in 
projects
Safe projects will not 
guarantee loan repayment
Borrower Training
Borrowers should be 
dissuaded from 
undertaking risky projects
Borrowers should be 
encouraged to invest 
boldly and productively
Consumption-based moral 
hazard not addressed
Credit Officer Training
Train credit officers to 
screen risky borrower 
projects from portfolio
Train credit officers to 
encourage clients' 
productive investment
Lender stifles 
entrepreneurial 
development among 
clients
Savings Mobilization
No particular emphasis on 
savings versus household 
consumption
Encourage the self-
discipline of  regular 
savings by clients
Borrowers aren't 
supported in developing 
savings discipline
Overall Theme Discourage risk-taking Promote investment Higher Default Rates
Concern
Consequences  of  
Incorrect Policy
Table 4: Policy Implications Consequences
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Appendix: Experiment Protocol and Instructions  (To be available on-line) 
Welcome Announcement 
Hi and thank you for being here today! 
Let’s start by introducing our research team: Eliana Zeballos, Giorgia Barboni y Arturo 
Rodriguez. If, at any point in the future, you would like to contact us or know more about this 
study, feel free to contact the main researcher responsible for this study: Alessandra Cassar, 
Associate Professor, Department of  Economics, University of  San Francisco, 21300 Fulton 
Street, San Francisco, CA 94117-1080. Tel. (415) 422-5351; Email: acassar@usfca.edu 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study that concerns the economics of  decision 
making. Your participation in this experiment is voluntary. However, we think you will find the 
experiment interesting. You could make a considerable amount of  money in this experiment in 
addition to the participation fee. This additional amount of  money depends partly on the 
choices you make in the activities that follow and partly on your luck. 
These activities are not designed to test you or your knowledge. What we want to know is 
what choices you prefer. The only right answer is what you really want to choose in a given 
situation. These activities give you the chance of  winning real money, so think hard about what 
choice you want to make in each activity. 
By signing the informed consent form you indicate your willingness to participate in the full 
length of  the experiment, which will take approximately three hours. Is everyone still able to 
stay for the full three hours?  
This study will consist of  a series of  8 activities and a final survey.  You will be given 
instructions for each activity and we will read them together. The instructions are simple and 
you will benefit from following them carefully. Also we will conduct practice rounds for each 
task. 
For each of  the activities you will be asked to make one or more decisions. At the end of  the 8 
tasks and the survey, you will draw a chip from a black bag; this bag has eight chips 
representing each of  the 8 tasks that we will conduct. Your payment will be determined by 
eliminating two zeros from the results of  the final round of  the activity indicated by the chip 
you drew. We will ask you to step aside for a moment and then call you back in, one at a time, to 
pay you in private. 
Thank you for your participation! 
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Instructions for Activity C1 
[MATERIAL: One six – face die]  
[SUBJECTS ARRANGEMENT:  As the subjects enter the room (or reenter from a break), they sit in 
rows away from each other to listen to the instructions. Once the instructions, the examples and the quiz 
are over, the subjects turn around so they cannot see each other any longer.] 
As we explained before, at the end of  the 8 activities, one activity will be chosen by having you 
draw a chip from a bag. If  the chip is C1 you will be paid in cash according to the earnings you 
gain in this activity. Remember that the final payoff  is calculated eliminating two zeros from 
the result of  the Final Round of  this activity. 
Activity C1 
For this activity, each one of  you will be a borrower. Everyone starts with a 500 bolivianos 
initial endowment that will be used as collateral for the loan that you are about to receive. Each 
loan is 1000 bolivianos and it needs to be repaid at a 20% interest rate. The repayment will then 
be 1200 bolivianos. 
The activity consists of  deciding what to do with your loan. You have 2 options: Project C and 
the Project S.  
You can either consume your loan (by choosing Project C) or invest it (by choosing Project S). 
If  you choose to invest your loan, you will have to roll the die to see if  your project is a success 
or a failure.   
The consumption activity (Project C) yields a gross return of  1500 bolivianos FOR SURE. 
If  you choose this project, it means that you are using your loan to buy products or services 
that don’t generate any kind of  return, and therefore, you will not have sufficient funds to repay 
the loan. Since you are NOT repaying your loan, the microfinance institution will keep your 
initial 500 bolivianos collateral. Your net return will then be 1500 bolivianos (500+1500-
500=1500):  
Project Probability Gross Return Net Return 
C 1 1500 500+1500-500=1500 
 
The investment activity (Project S) yields a gross return of  3000 bolivianos if  by rolling the 
die you get a 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5. If  this is the case, you will have to repay 1200 bolivianos for your 
loan but you will keep your collateral of  500 bolivianos since you pay on time. Your net return 
will then be 2300 bolivianos (= 500+3000-1200).  
However, if  you chose Project S and the die lands on a 6, your project fails and you will not 
receive anything. In this case, you will not be able to repay your loan and you will lose your 500 
bolivianos of  collateral. Your net return in this case would be 0 (=500+0-500).  
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Practice Runs 
[Each subject is asked to choose C and calculate returns. 
Each subject is asked to choose S, roll a die and calculate returns.] 
Quiz 
If  you choose S and you roll a 3. How much do you get, 0 or 2300? 
If  you choose S and you roll a 6. How much do you get, 0 or 2300? 
How much do you earn if  you choose C? 
 
[Each subject is asked to choose C or S in their answer sheet] 
 
Project Probability Gross Return Net Return 
S 
5/6  3000 500+3000-1200=2300 
1/6  0 500+0-500=0 
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Instructions for Activity C2 
[MATERIAL: One six-face die]  
[SUBJECTS ARRANGEMENT:  As the subjects enter the room (or reenter from a break), they sit in 
rows away from each other to listen to the instructions. Once the instructions, the examples and the quiz 
are over, the subjects turn around so they cannot see each other any longer.] 
As we explained before, at the end of  the 8 activities, one activity will be chosen by having you 
draw a chip from a bag. If  the chip is C2 you will be paid in cash according to the earnings you 
gain in this activity. Remember that the final payoff  is calculated eliminating two zeros from 
the result of  the Final Round of  this activity. 
Activity C2 
For this activity, each one of  you will be a borrower. Everyone starts with a 500 bolivianos 
initial endowment that will be used as collateral for the loan that you are about to receive. Each 
loan is 1000 bolivianos and it needs to be repaid at a 20% interest rate. The repayment will then 
be 1200 bolivianos.  
The activity consists of  deciding what to do with your loan. You can invest your loan in 2 
options: Project M or Project R. 
The investment activity in Project M yields a gross return of  3000 bolivianos if  by rolling 
the die you get a 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5. If  this is the case, you will have to repay 1200 bolivianos for 
your loan but you will keep your collateral of  500 bolivianos since you pay on time. Your net 
return will then be 2300 bolivianos (= 500+3000-1200).  
However, if  the die lands on a 6, your project fails and you will not receive anything. In this 
case, you will not be able to repay your loan and you will lose your 500 bolivianos of  collateral. 
Your net return in this case would be 0 (=500+0-500).  
 
On the other hand, the investment activity in Project R yields a gross return of  5000 
bolivianos if  by rolling the die you get a 1, 2, or 3. If  this is the case, you will have to repay 
1200 bolivianos for your loan but you will keep your collateral of  500 bolivianos since you pay 
on time. Your net return will then be 4300 bolivianos (= 500+5000-1200).  
However, if  the die lands on a 4, 5 or 6, your project fails and you will not receive anything. In 
this case, you will not be able to repay your loan and you will lose your 500 bolivianos of  
collateral. Your net return in this case would be 0 (=500+0-500). 
 
Project Probability Gross Return Net Return 
M 
5/6  3000 500+3000-1200=2300 
1/6  0 500+0-500=0 
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Practice Runs 
[Each subject is asked to choose M, roll a die and calculate returns. 
Each subject is asked to choose R, roll a die and calculate returns.] 
Quiz 
If  you choose the project M and you roll a 3. How much do you get, 0 or 2300? 
If  you choose the project M and you roll a 5. How much do you get, 0 or 2300? 
If  you choose the project R and you roll a 4. How much do you get, 0 or 4300? 
If  you choose the project R and you roll a 1. How much do you get, 0 or 4300? 
 
[Each subject is asked to choose M or R in their answer sheet] 
  
Project Probability Gross Return Net Return 
R 
1/2  5000 500+5000-1200=4300 
1/2  0 500+0-500=0 
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Instructions for Activity C8 (Risk Elicitation Task) 
 
[MATERIAL: Ten red chips, ten green chips, two bags, ten blue chips numbered from 1 to 10] 
 
[SUBJECTS ARRANGEMENT:  As the subjects enter the room (or reenter from a break), 
they sit in rows away from each other to listen to the instructions. Once the instructions, the 
examples and the quiz are over, the subjects turn around so they cannot see each other any 
longer.]  
 
As we explained before, at the end of the 8 activities, one activity will be chosen by having you 
draw a chip from a bag. If the chip is C8 you will be paid in cash according to the earnings you 
gain in this activity. Remember that the final payoff is calculated eliminating two zeros from 
the result of the final round of this activity. 
 
Activity C8 
For this activity we have 10 imaginary bags. Each one contains chips of  two different colors: 
green and red. A green chip will always represent a higher payoff  than a red chip. Bag 1, for 
example, has one green chip and nine red ones. Bag 5 has five green chips and five red ones. 
The last bag, Bag 10, has ten green chips and no red ones.  
In this game you have ten decisions to make, one for each imaginary bag. You will be asked to 
choose either Option A or Option B. If  you choose Option A your payoff  could result in either 
2000 bolivianos or 1600 bolivianos. On the other hand, if  you choose Option B your payoff  
could result in either 3850 bolivianos or 100 bolivianos. Please note that the potential payoffs 
for Options A and B are exactly the same for all the imaginary bags. 
Once you have made your choices for each of  the imaginary bags, you will draw one chip from 
two different bags to calculate your final payoff: 
The first bag will have ten chips numbered from 1 to 10. These chips represent each of  the ten 
imaginary bags: a chip with the number one, for example, represents Bag 1 where there is one 
green chip. A chip with the number 5 represents Bag 5 where there are five green chips, and so 
on. Finally, a chip with the number 10 represents Bag 10 where there are only green chips.  
Ultimately, the number on the chip you draw from the first bag represents the number of  green 
chips that will be included in the second bag. Again, if  you draw a chip with number one, the 
second bag will have one green chip and 9 red ones; if  you draw a chip with number 5, the 
second bag will include 5 green chips and 5 red ones. If  you draw chip number 10, the second 
bag will consist of  only 10 green chips and no red ones.  
Your payoff  will depend on two things: first, the Option (A or B) that you have chosen for the 
bag represented by the chip you draw from the first bag; and, second, the color of  the chip 
(green or red) that you draw from the second bag. For example, let’s suppose you draw a chip 
with number 5 from the first bag and then a green chip from the second bag. If  during the game 
you chose Option A for Bag 5 your payoff  will be 2000 bolivianos; if  you chose Option B, your 
payoff  will be 3850. However, note that if  you draw a red chip from the second bag, your payoff  
will be 1600 bolivianos if  you chose Option A or 100 bolivianos if  you chose Option B.  
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The table that we have installed in the front of  the room will help you make your decisions. 
Remember that there are no correct or incorrect answers. The decisions you make should 
depend only on what you think is best for you.  
      OPTION A OPTION B 
BAG Green Balls Red Balls If  green If  red If  green If  red 
1 1 9 
2000 1600 3850 100 
2 2 8 
3 3 7 
4 4 6 
5 5 5 
6 6 4 
7 7 3 
8 8 2 
9 9 1 
10 10 0 
Practice Runs 
[All participants will be asked to choose Option A for all the imaginary bags and then draw one chip 
from the first bag and a second chip from the second bag. Payoffs are calculated.  
All participants are asked to choose Option B for all the imaginary bags and then draw one chip from the 
first bag and a second chip from the second bag. Payoffs are calculated. 
All participants are asked to choose Option B up to Bag 5 and Option A from Bag 6 onwards. Then a 
chip is drawn from the first bag and another from the second bag to calculate payoffs.]  
Quiz 
1. How much would your payoff  be if  you chose Option A for all the imaginary bags, and 
then the chip you draw from the first bag has the number 1 and the one you draw from 
the second bag is green? 
2. How much would your payoff  be if  you chose Option A for all the imaginary bags, and 
then the chip you draw from the first bag has the number 1 and the one you draw from 
the second bag is red? 
3. How much would your payoff  be if  you chose Option B for all the imaginary bags, and 
then the chip you draw from the first bag has the number 1 and the one you draw from 
the second bag is green? 
4. How much would your payoff  be if  you chose Option B for all the imaginary bags, and 
then the chip you draw from the first bag has the number 1 and the one you draw from 
the second bag is red? 
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How to calculate the final payment? 
Outcome C2        2300 
2300 = 23Bs + 30Bs =  53Bs 
C
8 C
1 
C
1 
C
1 
C
1 
C
3 
C
2 
C
1 
C
1 
C4 
Activity C1: 
 
Project C 
Project S 
2300 Bs. 
0 Bs. 
1500 Bs. 
Individual Activity 
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Activity C2: 
 
Project M 
Project R 
4300 Bs. 
0 Bs. 
2300 Bs. 
0 Bs. 
Individual Activity 
Activity C8: 
 
OPTION A OPTION B 
BAG 
# 
Green Balls 
# 
Red Balls 
 
Payment 
 
Payment 
 
Payment 
 
Payment 
1 1 9 2000 1600 3850 100 
2 2 8 2000 1600 3850 100 
3 3 7 2000 1600 3850 100 
4 4 6 2000 1600 3850 100 
5 5 5 2000 1600 3850 100 
6 6 4 2000 1600 3850 100 
7 7 3 2000 1600 3850 100 
8 8 2 2000 1600 3850 100 
9 9 1 2000 1600 3850 100 
10 10 0 2000 1600 3850 100 
Individual Activity 
